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MEXICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPLES RELATING
TO REMOTE SENSING OF THE EARTH,
ITS NATURAL RESOURCES AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT
CARL Q. CHRISTOL*
Since 1970 the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) has been concerned with the formulation of a set of
principles relating to remote sensing from outer space.' This involvement, resulting in lengthy discussions in both the Legal and
the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committees, has taken into account a number of substantial concerns.
Sensing devices point in many directions. When they look upward they inquire into the unknown secrets of the universe. When
they are pointed outward they serve navigational needs. When
they point inward they examine, in a clinical fashion, the workings
of the men and machines that have been carried aloft. There has
been little cause to deny the suitability of such functions. Monitoring devices, however, also look intently and perceptively toward the
earth. As a result of this curiosity, personal and national privacy,
along with other jealously guarded possessions, have become objects for public inspection and open observation. These discreet inquiries have resulted in an erosion of privacy. This situation has
produced varied and substantial concerns about the use of the
highly refined capabilities of orbiting space objects and their component parts.
Remote sensing, as a practical fact of life, has had an impact
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1. The first submission was made by Argentina. COPUOS, Draft International Agreement on Activities Carried Out Through Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys of Earth Resources, (Agenda Item 3), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.73 (1970); COPUOS, Matters
Relating to the Activities Carried Out Through Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys of Earth
Resources, Annex 4 (Agenda Item 5) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/133 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys].
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on States, international intergovernmental organizations, commercial and scientific institutions, a variety of groups of people, and on
the individual. This impact has modified existing outlooks on economic, political and security matters. Sensing for example, can influence the identification and distribution of wealth. Moreover,
sensing can induce political dialogue calling for the sharing of the
benefits derived through the sensing process. Basic concerns as to
the condition of national security are raised by sensing, particularly
when it is assumed that one State has obtained important data relating to the military capabilities of other States.
Additionally, sensing has gathered a new treasure trove of scientific and technological data. This has led to collateral calls for
the widest possible sharing of such findings, as well as genuine assertions of the fundamental need for at least a modicum of privacy.
The reality of sensing has significantly contributed to an increasing
awareness of the small size of the universe and the close proximity
of its inhabitants.
. Sensing has substantially influenced the growing conviction
that the world's juridical and natural persons coexist in a world
community. However, it has also heightened an awareness that the
advanced States have already obtained access to critical resources.
This realization has produced urgent expressions from all quarters
of the developing world calling for the sharing of the newly acquired wealth and technological know-how. The confluence of the
foregoing concerns has directed attention toward the need for new
international legal regimes and world organizations to cope with
such forces, to facilitate the recognition of common interests, and to
give direction to the generalized and constant goal of human wellbeing.
It is well known that the activities of humans in outer space,
per se, the moon and other celestial bodies, are not wholly free and
unrestricted. Here, as elsewhere, the role of law is to constrain the
atomistic impulses of the human species. Thus, the entire function
of the international law of outer space throughout the space age has
been directed toward the identification of spatial areas and the
kinds of human-oriented and directed activities where limitations
are to prevail. The purpose underlying the formulation of such restraints is, of course, to separate situations requiring limitations
from those where limitations are considered to be unnecessary or
unrealizable. In these circumstances, the emergence of a substantial body of international space law attests to the existence of an

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/2

2

Christol: Mexican Contributions to the Development of Principles Relating t
REMOTE SENSING

OF EARTH

amalgam of legal rights and duties flowing from competing wants,
needs, interests, and values.
The considerations identified above, and others which are
readily identifiable, have found expression in the search for a set of
internationally approved principles governing remote sensing.
States, as the principal actors in the establishment of international
law, have identified their preferences within the framework of the
doctrine of national sovereignty. Thus, sensing States have urged
that their sovereignty enables them to engage in world wide sensing
activities. Sensed States, on the other hand, have contended that
their sovereignty should allow them some relief from the prying
inquisitiveness of the space-resource States. This division has produced dialogue relating to the need for formal limitations, on the
one hand, and the need to avoid unnecessary limitation, on the
other.
Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland, the long-time
chairman of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS, has summarized the situation as follows:
The fundamental problem lies in the present disagreement
that exists between States on the question whether there ought to
be limitations on remote sensing activities; on the dissemination
of data obtained from such activities; and on the dissemination
of information derived from such data.2
I.

LAW APPLICABLE TO REMOTE SENSING

International legal principles presently constrain unrestricted
remote sensing activities. Some precepts stem from the 1967 Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.3 Others are founded on broadly based international legal
principles.
Article 1 of the Principles Treaty specifies that the space environment is to be explored, exploited and used for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of eco2. Wyzner, Remote Sensing: Who Benefits? Earth-OrientedSpace Activities and Their
Legal Limitations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM OF THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH OF
AIR & SPACE LAW, MCGILL U. 119 (1981).

3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. (It entered into force for the United States on
Oct. 10, 1967. Mexico is a party to the Agreement.); see also 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 386
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Principles Treaty].
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nomic or scientific development and shall be the province of all
mankind. These terms presuppose there will be a sharing of the
benefits obtained. The provisions do not restrict a sensing State to
areas in which it possesses sovereignty, nor do they prohibit the
sensing State from sharing the benefits derived from sensing activities, such as the acquired basic data and the information derived
from an analysis of such data.
Article 3 provides that international law (and this would include customary international law as well as the UN Charter) is to
apply to space-environment activities.' Specific reference is made
to the need to engage in such activities in order to maintain international peace and security, and to promote international cooperation
and understanding.' The duty to maintain friendly relations and to
engage in international cooperation on the basis of equal national
rights stems from the UN Charter. The rights emanating from national sovereignty are also enshrined in the Charter.7 Thus, were
remote sensing perceived as a threat to the security of a State, that
State would have the legal power to take such national measures as
would be necessary to protect it from harmful remote-sensing
activities.'
Article 4 prescribes that the moon and other celestial bodies
shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.9 Article 6 imposes
international responsibility on States for national activities in the
space environment." This Article allows space activities to be car4. See 1967 Principles Treaty, supra note 3, at 386.
5. Id. at 387.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 386.
8. See LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE (N. Matte &
H. DeSaussure eds. 1976); Dauses, NationalSovereignty and Remote Sensing of Earth Resources by Satellites, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 121 (1974). The subject of
remote sensing of Earth resources was considered by other scholars at the 1973 meeting of
the International Institute of Space Law. See also Bordanov, PracticalUse of Space Vehicles
in the Light of the Principleof State Sovereignty Over NaturalResources, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 103 (1974); Christol, Space Sensing of Harms to the MarineEnvironment-Damages in InternationalLaw, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 106 (1974);
Galloway, IntroductoryReport, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 90 (1974); Hervy,
Aspects luridiques des Satellites de Detection des Resources Terrestres, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 137 (1974); Pikus, Possibility of Technical Control Over Resources
Surveying From Space, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 145 (1974); Tchernonog, La
Teledection des Resources Terrestres par Satellites- Aspects Juridiques, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 151 (1974); Williams, Earth-SurveyingFrom Space in the Light of the
Princpleof Sovereignty, 16 PROC. COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 164 (1974).
9. 1967 Principles Treaty, supra note 3, at 387.
10. Id.
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ried on by both national and international entities. In the first category, such activities may be those of both governmental agencies
and nongovernmental bodies. Article 7, as supplemented by the
1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects," imposes international liability for damage resulting from space activities to States and to their natural and juridical
persons. 12 Pursuant to Article 8, the State of registry of a launched
space object is to retain jurisdiction and control over the object and
its personnel while it is in the space environment. 13 Article 9 generally places emphasis on UN Charter principles.' 4 It specifically requires, however, that States engaging in the exploration,
exploitation, and use of the space environment are to be "guided by
the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities

. . .

with due regard to the corresponding

interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty."' 5 Article 11 imposes the duty on States engaged in conducting space-environment
activities to make reports to the UN Secretary-General on the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities.' 6 Many of the
foregoing principles were incorporated into the 1979 Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies. '7

In all of these formal international agreements there is no prohibition against the outer space activity of remote sensing. States
have engaged in this activity from the outset of the space age. The
United Nations and regional international organizations, moreover, have endeavored to facilitate this activity. Enormous human
and financial resources have been allocated to the function of remote sensing and to the dissemi nation of the data and information
8
flowing from such activities.'
Sensing activities must be evaluated from the perspective of
II. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762. (It entered into force for the United States on
Oct. 9, 1973. Mexico is a party to the agreement.)
12. 1967 Principles Treaty, supra note 3, at 388.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 1d.
16. Id. at 389.
17. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979); adopted by U.N.
GeneralAssembly as G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A/
34/46 (1979), reprintedin 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1434 (1979).
18. For a recent assessment of developments between the late 1960's and 1982, see C.
CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 720-64 (1982).
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the importance accorded to national sovereignty respecting the natural wealth and resources located within the territorial boundaries
of States. Remote sensing is perceived by developing countries as
being potentially prejudicial to their economic progress and welfare, especially because they depend so heavily upon land-based
minerals and ocean-based biological resources. Consequently, substantial efforts have secured the adoption of a large number of General Assembly resolutions dealing with national sovereignty over
natural resources. 19
The first UN resolution on this matter was Resolution 523 (VI)
of January 12, 1952, entitled "Integrated Economic Development
and Commercial Agreements. ' 20 The resolutions that followed
have been increasingly detailed, with one of the more important
being General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14,
1962.21 This resolution, as well as more recent resolutions, bear the
title "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources. '2 2 This
theme was also emphasized in two 1974 UN General Assembly
Resolutions dealing with "The Establishment of a New Interna24
23
tional Economic Order"; namely, 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI).
Many of the resolutions on this subject, because of their controversial content, have failed to obtain the votes of important States.
II.

THE MEXICAN ROLE IN REMOTE SENSING

The Latin-American countries have played an important role
in formulating proposals for the legal regulation of remote sensing
from outer space. 25 The 1970 Argentinian proposal was considered
by a Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS 2 6 in
January and February of 1973.27 The 1973 session also considered
a preliminary draft of legal principles submitted by the Soviet
19. Id.
20. G.A. Res. 523, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952).
21. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
22. Id.
23. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974).
24. G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974).
25. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 721.
26. COPUOS, Progress Report of the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth
by Satellite on the Work of its Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/ 11 (1973).
27. Id. For an appraisal of the early activities of the Working Group, see Fiorio, International Implications of Earth Resources Surveys by Satellites, I J. SPACE L. 1 (1973). An
early analysis of the Argentinian viewpoint, including specific references to the role of national sovereignty over natural resources, is contained in Barbosa, Los Satelites Equipados
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Union and cosponsored by France.2" Each country put forward
separate proposals in 1973 and presented a second joint draft in
1974.29 On October 15, 1974, Argentina and Brazil combined in
making a proposal which was cosponsored by Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela.3 °
The preamble to the Argentinian proposal of June 26, 1970,
referred to prior resolutions of the UN General Assembly relating
to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 3 Articles 3 and 6
of the submission referred to the establishment of an international
data bank containing information on earth resources disclosed during sensing.32 The proposal also included a provision requiring
that any dissemination of information should take into account the
interests and needs of the developing countries.33 Article 7 stressed
the principles of equality of economic rights and self-determination
by allowing individuals to exercise their legitimate and exclusive
rights over their natural resources. 34 To assure this outcome, Article 8 concluded that the exploitation of the natural resources by
each State in its territory and in its jurisdictional waters was to be
governed by national laws and regulations.3 5
The Brazilian proposal of February 4, 1974, was similar in a
number of respects to the Argentinian proposal.3 6 It identified the
need to give special consideration to the benefits and interests of the
developing countries.3 7 It referred to General Assembly resolutions
relating to the permanent sovereignty of people and nations over
con Sensores Remotos y los Recursos Naturales, 13 COLLOQUIUM L. OUTER SPACE 151

(1971).
28. COPUOS, urnra note 26
29. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 758.
30. COPUOS, Letter dated 15 Oct. 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina and Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/
1047 (1974). S. Gorove, Legal and Economic Implications of Remote Sensingfrom Outer
Space-Focus on Latin America, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM
OUTER SPACE 75 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).

31. COPUOS, Draft International Agreement on Activities Carried Out Through Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys of Earth Resources, (Agenda Item 3), U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/
C.2/L.73 (1970).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. COPUOS, Letter dated 1 February 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/122 (1974); 1974 Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys, supra note 1, at 3.
37. Id.
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their natural resources. 38 Further, it introduced suggestions which
have remained a bone of contention to the present: the requirement of State consent to foreign sensing.39 In addition, Article 7
provided that a sensing State could not disclose information gained
by it to any third State, international organization or private party
"without the express authorization of the State Party to which the
natural resources belong, nor can they utilize the information thus
obtained to the detriment of the latter."4
The emphasis by these two Latin-American countries on the
right of permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their
wealth and natural resources was also reflected in the French submission of May 15, 1973, 4 1 and the Soviet proposal of April 13,
1973.42 The right respecting wealth and natural resources was further extended by France and the Soviet Union in their joint working papers of May 27, 1974, to include information relating to
natural resources.4 3 Thus, States engaged in remote sensing were
called upon to "respect the principle of sovereignty of States and
especially the right of peoples and States to exercise permanent sovereignty over their wealth and resources." This was cited as a "basic element of their right to self-determination as well as their
inalienable right to dispose of their natural resources and of information concerning those resources." 44 The joint proposal rejected
the view that special preferences should be accorded to developing
countries, and affirmed that benefits should be accorded to all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development.4 5
It was in the context of the foregoing that the five Latin-Amer38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4.
41. COPUOS, Draft Principles Governing Remote Sensing of Earth Resources from
Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.69 (1973); 1974 Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys,
supra note i, at 5.
42. U.N. Doc. A/AC.15/C.2/L.88, Apr. 13, 1973; 1974 Remote-Sensing Satellite
Surveys, supra note 1, at 9.
43. COPUOS, Draft Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Field of Remote Sensing of Earth Resources by Means of Space Technology, (Agenda Item 5), U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.99 (1974); 1974 Remote-Sensing Satellite Surveys, supra note I, at 910.
44. Id.
45. The differences appearing in the 1974 drafts have been assessed by D. M. Polter.
See Polter, Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4 J. SPACE L. 103-05 (1976). He also
analyzes the role of information in diverse systems. Id. at 114-15.
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ican States submitted a new proposal on October 15, 1974.46 One
can only speculate as to. the precise effect that Chile, Mexico and
Venezuela had on the drafting of the new proposal. However,
when the five-partite submission is compared with the earlier separate proposals of Argentina and Brazil, it is clear that several of the
prior proposed principles were retained.4 7 Among these were references to: (1) the need to give special consideration to the interests
and needs of the developing countries; (2) the expectation that a
sensed State would be entitled to prohibit foreign remote sensing
unless the consent of the sensed State had been obtained; and (3)
the right of the sensed State to give its express authorization to the
sensing State before the latter could transmit or transfer information gained to a third State, international organization, or private
entity.4 8 In the new joint proposal, the earlier South American references to UN General Assembly resolutions dealing with permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their own natural
resources were transferred from the substantive provisions to the
preamble. However, in the 1974 five-partite proposal, reference
was made to the need to prevent the exploitation of natural resources causing the spoilation or destruction of the natural environment. 49 Further, Article 4 went into considerable detail on the
rights of sensed States to their natural resources. It provided:
Activities of remote sensing of natural resources by means of
space technology must be based on the principle of sovereign
equality of States and of the honorable fulfillment of international commitments, as well as other relevant principles of international law regarding friendly relations and cooperation among
States. The principles of sovereign equality of States and selfdetermination of peoples embrace not only the right to internal
sovereignty and independence, but also the economic aspects of
the freedom to use and distribute their wealth, whereby peoples
may exercise their legitimate50and exclusive sovereign rights over
their own natural resources.
The five-State draft provided that sensed States were to have
important rights to the data acquired by the foreign sensing State. 5'
Thus, the sensed State was entitled to full and unrestricted access to
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See S. Gorove, supra note 30, at 1.
C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 758 n.6.
Id.
See S. Gorove, supra note 30, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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all data obtained by the sensing State. The sensing State was prohibited from disclosing acquired information to third parties without the express authorization of the sensed State. A third party
would be allowed to solicit information from the sensing State only
upon receiving the express authorization of a sensed State. However, unlike the May 27, 1974, joint proposal of France and the
Soviet Union, the five-partite draft did not assert that the information obtained about natural resources was52to be accorded the same
treatment as the natural resources per se.
The extent of the Mexican influence on the five-State draft is
hard to glean from the official statements of Mexican representatives at the UN. In an intervention before the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee on April 18, 1974, the Mexican representative
referred to four levels of national capabilities in the application of
space technology.5 3 These ranged between States possessing advance knowledge to those totally unequipped or uninformed on the
subject.5 4 At the same time, Mexico and Argentina continued to
give full support to the Brazilian view that the study of the legal
aspects of remote sensing should take priority over other
inquiries.55
When the Legal Sub-Committee's working group on remote
sensing submitted its report in March of 1975, it identified five common elements in the joint French-Soviet draft, in the five-partite
Latin-American draft, and in a separate U.S. proposal.56 The five
agreed upon common elements were that: (1) remote sensing
should be conducted for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind with attention being given to the significance of sensing capabilities on developing countries; (2) remote sensing should be
conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN
Charter and the 1967 Principles Treaty; (3) international cooperation, particularly regional, would assure maximum benefits from
sensing; (4) national sensing programs should encourage international participation; and (5) the Earth's natural environment should
52. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 758 n.6.
53. COPUOS, Report of the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.I/SR.124 (1974).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 67.
56. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/147, Annex 3, at 2 (1975). The U.S. Working Paper was published as LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING OF THE EARTH FROM SPACE. Remote
Sensing of the Natural Environment of the Earth from Outer Space, (Agenda Item 4), U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.103 (1975).
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be protected through remote sensing.57 From this recitation it will
be seen that none of the unique proposals contained in the LatinAmerican submissions were able to obtain even a tentative
consensus.
When the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee met in
April of 1975, the Mexican representative again emphasized the
need to arrange for an agreement containing a legal framework for
national remote-sensing activities.5 8 The point was made that the
terms of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the General Assembly on December 12, 1974, and particularly Article 13, were relevant. 59 Article 13 states that every
country has the right to benefit from advances and progress in science and technology in order to accelerate its economic and social
development.60 The resolution also makes reference to the transfer
of technology and its importance to the developing countries. 6
By 1975 it was becoming clear that the United States favored a
policy of open dissemination of the data and information produced
by remote sensing.62 Moreover, in its view, access to such materials
was to be on an equal basis.63 Without such freedom to engage in
sensing and to disclose the information obtained, it was foreseen
that only the advanced States would obtain the benefits of science
and technology. 6 Thus, the proposition was rejected that "if each
State had a right to prohibit dissemination to third parties of data
about its territory, then those States would be more secure and better off."65 The same position was proposed by the United States
before the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, where it was
observed that a system requiring prior consent of sensed States
would produce vast diffi11culties. Such a system might result in a-reduction of the sensing activities which are so important to the reali57. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/147, Annex 3, at 2 (1975).
58. COPUOS, Summary of Studies on Cost Effectiveness in Remote Sensing, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/139/Add.1 (1975).
59. COPUOS, Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, at 96, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/
C.1/SR.145 (1975). The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

251 (1975).

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. COPUOS, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space at 63,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.233 (1975) (Statement of U.S. Representative before the Legal
Sub-Committee on Feb. 19, 1975).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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zation of benefits and the development of economic progress of the
Third World nations.66 These interventions were consistent with
the United States position advanced in 1976 in the Legal Sub-Committee.6 7 It was noted that the United States "had never recognized
that the principle of the sovereignty of a State over its natural resources applied to remote sensing activities."6 8
Beginning in 1976 the Working Group of the Legal Sub-Committee endeavored to negotiate an agreed upon set of principles.6 9
At the close of the 1976 discussions, the Working Group offered a
statement containing eight common elements.7 ° In 1977 this
number was increased to eleven. 71 In 1978, at the instance of Austria, a statement of seventeen principles was put forward. Seventeen principles graced the reports of 1979, 1980 and 1981; however,
much of the substance of the documentation was set forth in square
brackets indicating that the members of COPUOS had failed to
reach a consensus on the indicated content.7 2
The 1981 statement of principles, which had borrowed heavily
from the 1978 Austrian draft, indicated a general agreement on the
following: (1) the definitions of remote sensing, primary data, and
analyzed information; (2) that remote sensing provides general benefits, and serves the particular needs of the developing countries; (3)
sensing activities should be subject to international law, the UN
Charter, the 1967 Principles Treaty, and the 1973 ITU Convention;
66. COPUOS, Summary Record of the 200th Meeting, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.I/
SR.200 (1978); cf., Resource Sensing From Space, Prospectsfor Developing Countries, National Academy of Sciences (1977).
67. COPUOS, Summary Record of the 264th Meeting at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/
SR.264 (1976). A more detailed assessment of the U.S. position isset forth in M. LEIGH,
United States Policy of Collectingand Disseminating Remote Sensing Data, in Legal Implications of Remote Sensing from Outer Space, supra note 8, at 147.

68. Id.
69. COPUOS, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, Annex 4,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/171 (1976); U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/197, Annex 3, at 1, Apr. It,
1977; COPUOS, Report of the Chairman of the Working Group III, Annex 3, at 1,U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 105/218 (1978); COPUOS, Legal Implications of Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Space, with the Aim of Formulating Draft Principles, Annex 4, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/
AC. 105/240 1979; COPUOS, Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Remote
Sensing, Annex 2, at 1,U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/271 (1980); COPUOS, Report of the Chairman
of the Working Group on Remote Sensing, Annex 1,at i, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/288 (1981;
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/305, Annex 1, at 1, Feb. 24, 1982. For an assessment of the developments between 1976 and 1982, see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 735-57
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The situation as it stood in 1978 was assessed by Vlasic, The Evolution of the International Code of Conduct to Govern Remote Sensing by Satellite.- ProgressReport, 3 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 561 (1978).
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(4) opportunities for sharing in sensing programs should be encouraged; (5) that attention should be given to the protection of the
Earth's natural environment; (6) that technical assistance must be
provided on mutually agreed upon terms; (7) that the UN must
promote technical assistance, with sensing entities to provide notice
to the UN; (8) that notice must be provided so that protective measures might be taken against natural disasters; (9) that sensing States
shall not abuse the legitimate rights and interests of the sensed
States; and (10) that sensing States are to disclose technical information relating to sensing operations to developing countries.7 3
The remaining "principles" were severely restricted by the
presence of square brackets. This was evidence of a lack of agreement respecting proposed Principle 11 dealing with the international responsibility of States for the activities of their nationals.
Clarity was also lacking as to the respective rights and duties of
States, as set forth in Principle 12, concerning the conditions under
which a sensed State was to have access to acquired data and analyzed information. 74 Doubts also remained as to the meaning to be
accorded to Principle 13 dealing with notice of launch to the UN
and to sensed States, Principle 14 dealing with consultation upon
the request of a sensed State, Principle 15 relating to the nondisclosure to third parties of findings relating to natural resources; Principle 16 relating to the significance to be accorded to the concept of
national sovereignty over natural resources; and to Principle 17
dealing with the duty of prompt consultations relating to dispute
resolution, or the utility of other comparable procedures which
might be mutually agreed upon.7 5
Thus, by the time the Mexican set of principles was promulgated in 1981, the basic principle that remote sensing was lawful
had been well established.76 However, there remained a major
need for the clarification of concerns over national security resulting from the gathering and dissemination of collected data. Major
accommodations were also required respecting the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over national resources, as well as the identification of a forum allowing for the pricing of the benefits to be
distributed. It was in this context that the Mexican working paper,
73.
sources
.74.
75.
76.

COPUOS, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth, Its Natural Reand Its Environment, Annex 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/228 (1981).
See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 735-57.
Id.
Id.
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consisting of seventeen proposed principles, reached the Legal SubCommittee on March 19, 1981. 7 The significance of the Mexican
proposal can best be identified by comparing it with the 1981 draft
of the Legal Sub-Committee.7" Although first enunciated in 1981,
the Mexican proposal, was not considered in the Legal Sub-Committee until 1982. 79
In comparing the Mexican submission with those that had
evolved prior to 1981, it becomes clear that new directions had been
suggested by Mexico and that the integrity of the Latin-American
proposals was preserved." An article by article comparison between the text under consideration by the Legal Sub-Committee in
1981,81 and the 1981 Mexican submission clarifies the particular
perspectives of Mexico. The Mexican proposal adopted a number
of the perspectives contained in the earlier drafts. It selected a
number of new terms which presumably were employed to clarify
some of the phraseology of the preceeding drafts.8 2 The proposal
also added substantive changes designed to afford greater protection to a sensed State.8 3 Substantial attention was given to the subject of the consent of the sensed State regarding sensing and the
disclosure of materials resulting from sensing activities.84 In this
area, additional attention was focused on the need for a sensing
State to give prior notice to States and to the United Nations of
indicated activities.8 5 Portions of the Mexican proposal regarding
the giving of prior notice were inconsistent with existing treaty law,
notably Article 11 of the 1967 Principles Treaty. 6 By its acceptance of portions of previously submitted proposals, and with its
own orientation, the Mexican submission was designed to benefit
the nonresource States.
A more detailed assessment of the Mexican statement of principles reveals that Principle 1 favored a shortened and more concise
definition of the term "remote sensing of the Earth" than prior
77. U.N. Doc. WG/RS (1981)/WP. 2, Mar. 19,1981; COPUOS,supranote 73, Annex 1,
at 13. The proposal was entitled PrinciplesRelating to Remote Sensing ofthe Earth, Its Natural Resources and Its Environment.
78. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 735-57.
79. Id.
80. COPUOS, supra note 73, Annex 1, at 7.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 750.
83. Id. at 749-54.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 753.
86. Id. at 749-54; see also 1967 Principles Treaty, supra note 3, at 389.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/2

14

Christol: Mexican Contributions to the Development of Principles Relating t
REMOTE SENSING OF EARTH

drafts.87 This term was defined as the "remote sensing of the earth,
its natural resources and its environment from outer space." 88
Omitted from the definitional approach were the prior references to
"primary data" and "analyzed information." The proposal consistently substituted "shall" for "shall/should," the alternative terms
contained in earlier submissions.
Principle 2 changed the 1981 sub-committee draft reading that
remote sensing "should/shall" be carried out for the benefit and
interests of all countries "irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development and taking into consideration the particular
needs of the developing countries," into merely "the needs of the
developing countries."' 89 This policy viewpoint has not been confined to Latin American countries. Apart from being accepted by
the States composing the Committee of 77, the nonaligned countries have also adopted this policy as a primary objective. 9°
Principle 3 identified the applicable law on remote sensing;
namely, international law, the UN Charter, the 1967 Principles
Treaty, as well as the Mexican principles. Omitted from the statement was the sub-committee reference to the relevant instruments
of the ITU.
Principle 4 deals with cooperative space activities. 9 Mexico
proposed that the terms of the 1981 draft should be amended to
"sensed" States rather than calling on the space-resources States to
make available to "other" States opportunities for participation in
these programs.9 2
The fifth Mexican principle was designed to afford greater protection to the environment than had been posited in the sub-comittee draft.9 3 Although consistent with the earlier submissions, the
Mexican proposal would accord protection to the Earth, its natural
resources, and its natural environment. To secure the performance
of the proposed duty, it was suggested that States were to make
available "to the competent United Nations authorities" any infor87. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 749-54.
88. Id.
89. The sub-committee expression "taking into consideration the particular needs of the
developing countries" can be traced back to paragraph seven of the General Assembly Resolution entitled Declarationof Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of NationalJurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
90. Id.
91. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 750.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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mation useful for the prevention "and control" of phenomena detrimental to the natural environment.94
Principle 6 restated the provision contained in earlier drafts
relating to the availability to nonresource States of technical assistance.95 A caveat was added, however, which provided that the assurances contained in the principle were without prejudice to the
rights of sensed States as set forth in the complete statement of
principles.
Principle 7 is one of numerous principles designed to publicize
the fact that remote sensing programs were being conducted. This
principle called upon States engaged in remote sensing programs of
the Earth to give prior notice to the UN Secretary-General. 9 6 This
approach would have modified the requirements set forth in Article
11 of the 1967 Principles Treaty, which did not call for prior notice. 97 The Mexican submission is also inconsistent with the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
where the requirement of notice was not that of "prior" notice.
Principle 7 further specified
that the Secretary-General should pub98
lish the notification.
Principle 8 also deals with notice, although the terminology is
that of information. Thus, when a programmatic State becomes
aware of natural disasters, it is obliged to communicate this information to affected States and to the UN. No requirement to disclose data is suggested, although this prescription had been set out
in the earlier drafts of the sub-committee. 99
Principle 9 used the expression "results" to identify the data
and information resulting from sensing activities."° In this principle the focus was on the developing countries attaining the "results" acquired by advanced States through remote sensing.
Principle 9 called for the use of such results by the sensing States
"with strict respect for sovereign rights."'
This innovative proposal was combined with the previously ventilated concern for uses
which were compatible with the legitimate interests of other States.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
1967 Principles Treaty, supra note 3, at 389.

98. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 18, at 750-5 1.

99. Id. at 751.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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The prior sub-committee drafts had made references to both the
"rights" and "interests" of other States.
Although Principle 9 takes into account nondisclosure, the
tenth principle goes in the opposite direction. It calls for the dissemination of technical information. °2 The earlier sub-committee
drafts had identified the need to effect disclosures of "any technical
information involving possible operational systems."'' 0 3 However,
the Mexican draft would have imposed a much greater duty on
sensing States. It suggested that States engaging in sensing activities "shall make available" technical information. This is in opposition to the terms of the sub-committee draft which merely
indicated that States "shall be prepared to make available the data
and information."l° Further, the Mexican submission did not contain the language of the sub-committee's draft which indicated that
sensing States were merely to provide the technical information
"which they are free to disclose."' 0 5
Principle 11 dealt with the traditional problem of imposing international responsibility for activities carried on by States and international organizations." °6 The principal difference between the
Mexican and the sub-committee draft was the substitution of the
expression "ensuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the present principles,"'' 0 7 for the square-bracketed
term "guarantee that such activities will comply with the provisions
of these principles."'' 0 8 Additionally, the Mexican draft in dealing
with "activities" rather than "programs" carried on by international organizations, made express reference to the terms of Article
6 of the 1967 Principles Treaty.
A major difference in the two drafts is that the Iviexican submission made no reference to the earlier proposals that a sensed
State was to have timely and nondiscriminatory access to primary
data concerning its territory on suitable terms no later than access
would be granted to any third State. 0 9 The sub-committee's 1981
draft made provision for the foregoing as well as the accompanying
right to receive analyzed information.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751-52.
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Without making use of the expression "access," the Mexican
draft Principle 14 was designed to achieve substantial benefits. It
reads: "States carrying out programs for remote sensing of the
Earth shall provide States, which are subject to remote sensing with
the preliminary information and final results and conclusions relating to the natural resources of the territory, territorial sea and maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the sensed State.""'
In Principle 12 of the Mexican draft, attention was again called
to the provision of notice by a sensing State to a sensed State."' In
this principle the proposed requirement is that of "advance notifi,auuf,." Sinliif Lu rrmcipie 14, the subjectea geographicai area
consisted of national "territory, territorial sea2 and maritime areas
under the jurisdiction of the sensed State." 1
In the thirteenth Mexican principle a new function of "consultation" was identified. The duty was imposed on the sensing State,
upon request, to consult with a sensed State. This duty related to
the prescription set out in Principle 14, whereby the sensing State
was to provide sensed States with the "preliminary information and
final results and conclusions relating to the natural resources" of
the identified areas.' 1 3 The intent underlying this policy was to
"promote international cooperation and friendly relations among
States and to enhance the mutual benefits to be derived from this
activity." 14
Principle 15 of the Mexican draft was founded on the perceived need for privacy on the part of developing countries. This
principle, similar to those found in the previously considered subcommittee provision, was designed to restrict disclosures of sensed
data and information. Principle 15 declares: "States carrying out
remote sensing of the Earth shall not, without the approval of the
sensed State, disseminate information or results and conclusions regarding the natural resources of that State."' "15 This provision departed from the square-bracketed subcomittee draft in four
respects. First, it omitted reference to the "territories" of the State
affected by sensing activities. Second, it did not impose prohibitions against the disposition of "any data" acquired through sensing. Third, it substituted for "data" the expression "results and
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 752-53.
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conclusions." Fourth, it did not restate the sub-committee's prohibition against disclosure to "third States, international organizations, public or private entities.""' 6 The Mexican draft imposed
more restrictions on disclosure than had previously been presented
to the sub-committee.
Principle 16 was designed to protect the perceived interests of
developing countries in national sovereignty over natural resources.
Unlike the sub-committee's square-bracketed draft principles, the
Mexican submission enlarged the expression "remote sensing of the
Earth" to include "exploration and use of the Earth, including the
territories and resources of sovereign States."" ' 7 Further, the Mexican draft extended the meaning of the concept of full and permawealth and natural resources to
nent national sovereignty over
'
include "economic activity. 18
The final Mexican principle dealt with dispute resolution. It
enlarged the sub-committee's seventeenth principle by making specific reference to the UN Charter and to the October 24, 1970, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations. 11 The Mexican draft called for disputants to hold consultation rather than "prompt consultations." It
also called for an extended reference to alternative procedures.
Thus, it suggested for the first time, that if consultations were not
adequate to bring about a resolution of a dispute, States were to
have recourse to other means "until a peaceful solution to the dis120
pute is found."'
TTT

'C NCLT SION

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the underlying theme of
the Mexican submission is to impose constraints on the sensing activities of States and to ensure that sensed States are not prejudiced
by the disclosure of materials obtained through the sensing process.
These restrictions can be summarized as follows: (I) a sensing
State is to provide "advance notification" to a sensed State of forthcoming activities; (2) a sensing State is to consult with a sensed
State upon the request of the latter; (3) a sensing State is to provide
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id.
Id.; U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 101/L.3 (1982), reprintedin 10 J. SPACE L. 250 (1982).
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a sensed State with "preliminary information and final results and
conclusions" relating to the natural resources falling under the jurisdiction of the sensed State; (4) a sensing State is prohibited from
disclosing its findings without the approval of the sensed State; (5)
the enlargement of a State's full and permanent sovereignty over its
wealth and natural resources is to include "economic activity" and
(6) there is the duty of disputants to pursue peaceful processes of
dispute resolution until a "solution" is found.
The Mexican draft does not explicitly recognize the right of
one State to engage in remote sensing of the area and resources of
t1tL. LCL, Uy SeCking to impose specinc iimitations on
auAw 1h Q
such sensing, the existence of the right to engage in peaceful sensing
activities was acknowledged. Ultimately, the Mexican submission
did not subscribe to an absolute right of privacy.
Some of the Mexican efforts to substitute new terms for those
that had gained recognition during the sub-committee deliberations
appear to have questionable value. Thus, the substitution of "results" in Principle 9 for the previously employed "data or information" would impose constraints on the finalization of valid
distinctions between "primary data" and "analyzed information."
Following its 1981 submission of principles, the Mexican government served as the spokesman for the Committee of 77 at the
1982 Unispace Conference. At that time a proposal was submitted
indicating the firm allegiance of the less-developed countries to the
principle that remote sensing should be carried out in accordance
with the sovereign rights of States. Further, it was pointed out that
this large group of States believed "that sensed States should have
timely and unhindered access on a priority basis at nominal cost to
all data and information obtained over their territories." '' Concern was also expressed as to the access of third parties to the data
and information resulting from sensing activities. The viewpoint of
Mexico and the Group of 77 was that such disclosures were not to
take place without "prior consent of the sensed country."' 1 2 2 They
also indicated their belief that the subject of remote sensing should
be given a high priority in COPUOS so that a statement of principles might be finalized.
Whether the announced goal is to be realized in the near future appears to be debatable. Mexico has been able to provide
leadership on this subject for a large number of the world's devel121. Id.
122. Id.
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oping countries. Unfortunately, the focus is more on the maintenance of a closed society than on the search for an accommodation
with the world's more advanced and powerful States. The gap between opposing views on wants, needs, interests and values has not
been closed. Pending the negotiation of a formal set of principles,
it may be predicted that the advanced States will continue to expand their already very large sensing capabilities. Over time it may
be possible to persuade all, or at least a substantial number, that the
benefits to be derived from the sharing of data and information
acquired via the sensing process is of greater importance than the
present inclination to seek out a degree of privacy, which, in fact, is
not likely to be found on this Earth.
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